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The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts has the potential to 
significantly impact on the terms of contracts for the sale of land. The definition of ‘consumer contract’ 
includes contracts for the sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual wholly or predominantly for 
personal or domestic use. Therefore, a contract for the purchase of a residence for personal occupation by 
the buyer, as opposed to a purchase for investment purposes, will be a consumer contract potentially 
attracting the application of the unfair terms provisions. Significant consumer protection mechanisms 
already exist in most state jurisdictions requiring disclosure of relevant matters to the buyer and providing 
remedies for the provision of misleading conduct. Minimal evidence of unfair terms in land contract was 
presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Australian Consumer Policy Framework raising 
the question as to whether there is an identified problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, 
whether the same economic and ethical rationales justify regulatory intervention. This article examines 
what effect if any the introduction of the unfair contract provisions will have on the enforcement of 
residential land contracts and the viability of previously accepted conditions if challenged as being “unfair 
terms”. The article concludes that despite the existence of several potentially unfair terms in some land 
contracts, the intervention of the rules of equity to overcome perceived hardship or unfairness to buyers 
from strict enforcement of terms means the unfair terms provisions are only likely to operate on terms 
untouched by those principles. In the authors’ view the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions 
will be limited to terms untouched by the principles of equity and consumer protection legislation making it 
unlikely that there will be any significant realignment of the contractual obligations and rights of buyers 
and sellers of land. 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts was 
introduced on 1 July 2010, as part of the national review of the Australian consumer 
policy framework culminating with the introduction of the Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL) and the renaming of the Trade Practices Act 1974 as the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The catalysts for the national review were two Productivity 
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Commission (PC) reports in 2006
3
 and 2008.
4
 The core consumer policy objective 
favoured by the PC in the 2008 inquiry and upon which the ACL is based is: 
 To improve consumer well-being through consumer empowerment and protection 
fostering effective competition and enabling confident participation of consumers 
in markets in which both consumers and suppliers trade fairly.
5
 
 
Underpinning this objective are several operational objectives, the most relevant for the 
purpose of this article being ‘to prevent practices that are unfair’.6 While unfair practices 
such as misleading conduct and unconscionable conduct were already regulated under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, no national approach to the prohibition of unfair terms 
existed.
7
 An unfair term was considered by the PC to be a term that disadvantages one 
party (usually consumers) but is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
legitimate interests of the other party.
8
 
 
The existence of unfair terms in standard terms contract was highlighted to the PC both 
prior to and as part of the Inquiry
9
 by the numerous articles and submissions calling for 
                                                 
3
  Productivity Commission, Review of the Australia Consumer Product Safety System: Research 
Report (7 February 2006) available at 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/productsafety/docs/finalreport> (accessed April 2011). 
4
  Productivity Commission, 2008, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45,  
Canberra.  Available at <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> 
(accessed  April 2011). 
5
  Productivity Commission, 2008, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45, 
Canberra, Recommendation 3.1, vol 2, pp 41-42.  Available at 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> (accessed April 2011). Adopted 
by COAG in the Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law signed on 2 July 
2009. 
6
  The other operational objectives include: (i) to ensure that consumers are sufficiently well-informed 
to benefit from and stimulate effective competition; (ii) to ensure that goods and services are safe 
and fit for the purposes for which they were sold; (iii) to meet the needs of those consumers who are 
most vulnerable and  at the greatest disadvantage; (iv) to provide  accessible and timely redress 
where consumer detriment has occurred and (v) to promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement: S 
G Corones, The Australian Consumer Law, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2011,[2.40]. 
7
  Unfair terms provisions for consumer contracts were enacted in Victoria in 2004 by amendment to 
the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). In NSW the Contracts Review Act 1980, s 7 purported to regulate 
unjust contracts. 
8
  Productivity Commission, 2008, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45,  
Canberra, p 404.  Available at <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> 
(accessed April 2011). 
9
  Productivity Commission, 2008, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45,  
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the introduction of legislation prohibiting unfair terms in contracts with consumers.
10
 
Consumer groups argued that unfair terms were endemic in certain consumer contracts 
such as the supply of goods and services such as mobile phones,
11
 electricity,
12
 travel,
13
 
or online software
14
 where complex standard contracts are used and little or no 
opportunity is provided to negotiate, although evidence of exploitation by suppliers of 
these terms against consumers was scant. Legal commentators argued that the existing 
common and statutory law
15
 did not adequately recognise the “substantive” unfairness in 
common consumer transactions almost exclusively undertaken by standard form 
agreements.
16
 Courts are traditionally only moved to relieve a party of performance of a 
bargain if “there [is a] circumstance, other than the mere terms of the contract itself that 
would render reliance on the terms of the contract ‘unfair’, ‘unreasonable’, ‘immoral’ or 
‘wrong’ ”.17 Therefore, in the absence of some unconscionable, misleading or inequitable 
conduct by the other party to the contract, the terms of the contract, even if inherently 
unfair, were generally enforced.
18
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Minimal evidence of the extent of unfair terms in real estate contracts
19
 was provided to 
the PC as part of the Inquiry, which raises the question as to whether there is an identified 
problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, whether the same economic and 
ethical rationales
20
 justify regulatory intervention in contracts for the sale of real estate as 
in other contracts. First, the article will seek to establish whether there is a problem 
facing consumers of real estate by (i) reviewing the evolution of standard form contracts 
for the sale of land and the extent to which consumers of land are affected by unfair 
terms; (ii) analysing consumer complaints data about unfair terms in relation to real estate 
transactions and, lastly, (iii) by reviewing the case law over the last 20 years to identify 
the incidence of claims related to unfair terms in real estate contracts.  
 
Secondly, the impact of the unfair terms provisions of the ACL on real estate contracts 
will be examined and finally, a number of potentially unfair terms commonly appearing 
in contracts for the sale of strata lots will be examined against the criteria in the ACL. 
The article concludes that in all but the most egregious cases, the effect of the new 
provisions may be minimal, leaving open the question of whether, in the context of land 
contracts, the unfair terms provisions were warranted and what realignment (if any) of the 
contractual obligations of buyers and sellers of land will result from the provisions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
  Real estate contracts will be used to refer to contracts for the sale of land. Some evidence was 
provided by Consumer Affairs Victoria that a small percentage of complaints about unfair or 
misunderstood terms involved ‘buying, selling or letting a home’: Consumer Detriment in Victoria: 
A Survey of its Nature, Costs and Implications, Research Paper No 10, October 2006. 
20
  First, regulation could be justified by an extension of the ethical principle of fairness in contracts (a 
principle already recognised in statutes prohibiting unconscionability) and secondly, on the 
economic basis that inappropriate risk assessments by consumers will lead to market failures, such 
as underinsurance and inefficient risk bearing by suppliers. These benefits were weighed against the 
evidence of low additional compliance costs or unintended consequences for business, when the 
experience in other jurisdictions with unfair terms regimes was examined.  Productivity Commission 
Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45, Canberra, Vol 2, p 433, 440.  
Available at <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> (accessed April 
2011). 
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II - IDENTIFYING A PROBLEM 
 
A. Community Expectations and Detriment 
Community expectations of the ethical conduct of sellers of residential property have 
been used previously as the rationale for the introduction of information disclosure 
laws.
21
 Information disclosure regimes have been used extensively in Australian 
jurisdictions to overcome the perceived information asymmetry in the seller and buyer 
relationship and thereby improve the fairness of the transaction.
22
 However, there is 
growing evidence that information disclosure regimes have failed to take account of the 
reality of consumer behaviour and that consumers continue to enter into disadvantageous 
transactions despite information disclosure.
23
 The PC has again sought to justify 
intervention in the contractual relationship of parties on the basis that fairness is a highly 
valued ethical norm.
24
 The majority of submissions received by the PC sought to justify 
regulation of unfair terms on this basis. Not only do cases of unfairness undermine trust 
and social capital generally, it can have the effect of increasing costs and creating 
inefficiency in transactions.
25
 While the authors accept this is a strong rationale for 
intervention, and may be sufficient in the absence of persuasive data, the examples of 
                                                 
21
  New South Wales Fair Trading Minister, Reba Meagher, in responding to a case involving a failure 
by a real estate agent to disclose the fact a triple murder occurred in a house identified a community 
expectation of proper disclosure by sellers of real estate. Refer to 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/default.asp?task=read&id=21951&site=LE> (accessed 17 
December 2009). 
22
  S Stern, ‘Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of Residential Real Estate 
Conveyancing’ [2005] Utah Law Review 57; T S Ulen ‘The Growing Pains of Behavioural Law and 
Economics’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1747. 
23
  Refer to the discussions in L Griggs, ‘Intervention or empowerment – Choosing the consumer law 
weapon’ (2007) 15 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 111; S Christensen, W Duncan & A 
Stickley, “Behavioural Biases and Information Disclosure Laws Relating to Residential Property 
Sales: Narrowing the Gap between existing laws and calls for future reforms” (2009) 2 Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 251; C Camerer, S Issacharoff, G Loewenstein, et 
al, “Regulation for conservatives: Behavioural economics and the case for ‘asymmetric paternalism’’ 
(2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1211; C R Sustein, ‘Informational Regulation 
and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond’ (1999) 147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
613; S Stern, ‘Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of Residential Real Estate 
Conveyancing’ [2005] Utah Law  Review 57. 
24
  Productivity Commission Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45,  
Canberra, Vol 2, p 413.  Available at 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> (accessed April 2011). 
25
  Productivity Commission (2003) Social Capital: Reviewing the Concept and its Policy Implications, 
Research Paper, AusInfo. 
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unfair terms provided to the PC existed primarily in contracts for the sale of goods and 
services.  
 
Evidence of the existence and extent of unfair terms across a range of contracts was 
provided to the PC by a number of consumer groups. Considerable evidence and 
examples were provided of the existence of unfair terms in standard form contracts for 
mobile phones, hire cars, financial services, and electricity services.
26
 The only reference 
to unfair terms in real estate contracts was contained in the survey conduct by CAV
27
 
where misunderstood or unfair terms in buying, selling and letting a home accounted only 
for 9% of the consumer detriment related to misunderstood or unfair terms.
28
 While the 
evidence of consumer detriment from unfair terms was only 2.4% of total consumer 
detriment, it translated to 200,000 cases per year in Victoria suggesting 750,000 Australia 
wide. International evidence of consumer detriment from unfair terms was similar with 
3.8% in the UK and 4% in South Africa.
29
 Unfair terms in real estate transactions or 
residential lettings do not form a significant component of consumer complaints about 
unfair terms.
30
 
Despite the minimal evidence presented to the PC as part of the Inquiry, do standard form 
land contracts contain unfair terms?
31
 
                                                 
26
  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) Comments on Unfair Contract Terms: A 
Discussion Paper produced by the Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs Unfair 
Contract Terms Working Party, March; Consumer Action Law Centre (2008), Submission to the 
Victorian Credit Review, 15 January from <http://www.consumeraction.org.au>; European 
Commission (2000) Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Brussels, April; Standing 
Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs (2004) Unfair Contract Terms, Discussion Paper, 
Working Party Unfair Contract Terms, January.  
27
  Consumer Affairs Victoria, Consumer Detriment in Victoria: A Survey of its Nature, Costs and 
Implications, Research Paper No 10, October 2006. 
28
  The total consumer detriment from misunderstood or unfair terms was only 2.4% of total detriment. 
29
  The number is higher in the case of online transactions. See The European Online Marketplace: 
Consumer Complaints 2007, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/ECC_E-
commerce_report.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2011). 
30
  Notably the European Union in reviewing the current consumer directives propose to replace 4 
directives with one consumer rights directive, including unfair terms. Contracts for the sale of land 
will not be part of that directive. Refer to the summary at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/609&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN> (accessed 21 April 2011). 
31
  An unfair term was defined by the Productivity Commission as a term that disadvantages one party 
(usually consumers) but is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of 
the other party. 
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B. Standard Terms Contracts  
Standard terms contracts for the sale of land are widely used in several Australian 
jurisdictions.
32
 The majority of sale transactions in Australia utilise the standard terms 
endorsed for use by the relevant Law Society or Real Estate Institute. Even if contracts 
are individually drafted, lawyers commonly adopt the standard terms with appropriate 
modifications.
33
 Like other standard terms contracts, the standard terms for the sale of 
land are rarely negotiated or changed by the parties, although additional conditions 
(referred to as special conditions) are commonly added at the request of the buyer for 
finance and building inspections. The fact standard terms for a land contract are rarely 
negotiated may suggest that these contracts have the potential to be disadvantageous to 
consumers.  
 
If an unfair term is a term that disadvantages one party (usually consumers), but is not 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the other party,
34
 
several potential examples of unfair terms in standard land contracts can be identified 
where: 
1. the seller is given a unilateral right to rescind the contract if the seller was 
unable or unwilling to comply with a requisition as to title,
35
  
2. the buyer’s right to terminate for a defect in title, encroachment or 
misdescription is limited or removed;
36
 
3. the risk of damage or destruction to the property passes to the buyer upon 
signing the contract; 
37
 
4. the seller may terminate the contract for any breach by the buyer.  
 
                                                 
32
  Standard conditions of sale are commonly used in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South 
Australia and Western Australia. 
33
  In addition to standard conditions of sale, Victoria and New South Wales also provide for the 
incorporation of standard conditions by regulation: Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 48; 
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 60. 
34
  Productivity Commission, 2008, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45,  
Canberra, p 404.  Available at <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> 
(accessed April 2011). 
35
  See, for example, clause 8 NSW Standard Contract (2005 ed). 
36
  See, for example, clause 7.5 of the REIQ Houses and Land Contract 9
th
 ed (Qld). 
37
  See, for example, clause 8.1 of the REIQ Houses and Land Contract 9
th
 ed (Qld);  
 8 
While a number of these clauses are potentially unfair, it is important to note the effect of 
equitable principles on land contracts. The operation of standard terms in land contracts 
have always given way to the rules of equity and there are numerous examples where 
standard terms have not been enforced against a buyer because the outcome would be 
unfair to the buyer. For example, a common standard term used by sellers is that no 
misdescription or error in particulars of the land specified in the contract will annul the 
sale, but the buyer is entitled to compensation for any deficiency. Whilst this provision 
benefits the seller in many cases, if the misdescription or error in particulars is material or 
substantial, the buyer will not be forced to take compensation, but may rescind the 
contract in equity.
38
 The rules of equity, where possible, will intervene to overcome any 
perceived hardship or unfairness that a buyer may suffer upon a strict interpretation or 
application of a standard term.  For instance, in Faruqui v English Real Estates Ltd,
39
 
Walton J gave no effect to a standard term whereby the buyer was deemed to have 
knowledge of the contents of certain documents affecting the title, when in fact the 
evidence showed that the buyer had never read them. In Farrand’s words “the courts 
[have] no sympathy for a seller who not only misdescribes the property sold but also 
seeks to escape the consequences by reliance upon the conditions of sale”.40 Therefore, 
regardless of the effect of the printed word, agreed to by the buyer, the courts generally 
attempt to do equity between the parties and not all standard conditions are strictly 
enforced.
41
 In general, however, the conventional  reason why equity would not enforce 
land contracts related, in the main, to the non-disclosure of a material or substantial 
defect in title
42
or a substantial want of title from that disclosed in the contract giving rise 
to a material misdescription.
43
 Equity did not intervene because of a claim by the buyer 
that the terms were unfair in the sense understood by this legislation and the mere fact 
                                                 
38
   The rule became known commonly as the Rule in Flight v Booth (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 370 after the 
case that decided the point. See also HW Wilkinson, The Standard Conditions of Sale of Land 
(Longman, 4
th
 ed, 1989) 241-246. See also Re Hewitt’s Contract [1963] 1 WLR 1298, 1301 per 
Wilberforce J (as he then was). 
39
     [1979] 1 WLR 963 at 965, 967; see also Topfell v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 446. 
40
    JT Farrand, Contract and Conveyance (Oyez Longman, 4
th
 ed, 1983) 55. 
41
    See Leominster Properties Ltd v Broadway Finance Ltd (1981) 42 PC & R 372, 387 per Slade J. 
42
        Phillips v Caldcleugh (1868) LR 4 QB 159. 
43
        Shepherd v Croft [1911] 1 Ch 521. 
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that specific performance was not awarded  in these circumstances did not, of itself, make 
any terms of contract unfair. 
 
Unlike other commercially used standard form contracts, standard terms contracts for the 
sale of land in each jurisdiction are regularly reviewed by the relevant professional 
bodies
44
 with regard to regulatory changes and case law. Consequently, the standard 
terms contracts for the sale of land are more dynamic and responsive to the position of 
the seller and buyer than other standard terms contracts.  These are key aspects 
underlying the view that standard terms contracts for the sale of land are generally 
regarded as providing an appropriate balance of obligations between the parties to the 
agreement. The NSW Law Society suggests that standard terms land contracts in each 
jurisdiction actually contribute to familiarity of terms, the use of comprehensive terms, 
compliance with legislation, efficiency in transactions and have the advantage of being 
endorsed and updated by professional bodies.
45
 Despite this view of the standard 
contracts having enjoyed some recent judicial acceptance in New South Wales,
46
 is there 
any evidence of unfair terms being used against buyers of real estate?  
 
C. Claims by buyers of unfair practices  
Reported cases involving land contracts are replete with claims by buyers that it would be 
unfair to enforce a contract against them because of unfair tactics, misleading conduct 
and unfair pressure in the purchase process. These cases commonly involve allegations of 
misleading conduct,
47
 estoppel or unconscionable conduct.
48
 Notably, the majority of 
                                                 
44
  Standard conditions of sale in NSW are endorsed by the Law Society of NSW; in Queensland by the 
Queensland Law Society and REIQ; in Victoria standard terms are given a statutory imprimatur by 
Table A of the 7
th
 Schedule of Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) and the REIV and Law Institute of 
Victoria, in South Australia by the REISA and in Western Australia by the REIWA. Similarly in the 
UK the standard conditions are endorsed by the Law Society for England and Wales. 
45
  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission to the Treasurer, The Hon. Dr Craig Emerson MP in 
relation to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill No 1 2009, available at 
<http://www.lawsociety.com.au/idc/groups/public/documents/internetpolicysubmissions/023797.pdf
> (accessed 15 April 2010) 
46
        Heilpern v Anasco [2010] NSWSC 317 at [37] per Brereton J, “It is impossible to identify any 
substantive injustice in the terms of the subject contract.  The contract and its terms are not harsh or 
unjust.  Its terms were the standard conditions for a contract for sale of land”. 
47
  See for example, Zhang v Vp302 Spv [2009] NSWSC 73; Ackers v Austcorp International Ltd [2009] 
FCA 432; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; MacCormick v Nowland 
(1988) ATPR 40-852; Demagogue  Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31. 
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reported cases involving unconscionability in relation to land contracts concern a taking 
advantage of the weaker position of the buyer,
49
 misrepresentation
50
 or a claim that the 
forfeiture of money paid is a penalty.
51
 Only a small minority have actually alleged that a 
term of the contract itself was unfair. For example, in Mirvac (Docklands) Pty Ltd v La 
Rocca,
52
 a buyer of an apartment “off the plan” claimed that a term of the land contract 
was unfair unjust and unreasonable. This term, which is standard in every contract for the 
construction and sale of residential property “off the plan”, provided that the seller might 
vary the building plans and specifications from time to time during construction in any 
manner that the seller considered necessary or desirable, including by substituting any 
fixtures or fittings specified in those plans with appliances of “like quality”. Hargrave J 
found that such a provision did not meet that alleged description as it was not unfair or 
unreasonable to permit the seller some “reasonable flexibility” to amend the building 
plans and specifications during the construction phase given the large scale of the 
development.
53
 The buyer also alleged that the clause permitting the seller to retain 
control of the body corporate to the exclusion of the buyer was unreasonable and unjust. 
Hargrave J held, to the contrary, that the clause was “commercially justifiable” in the 
circumstances.
54
 
 
In the few cases where buyers have alleged unconscionable conduct arising from the 
terms of the contract against their seller, they have not received the warmest reception 
from the courts. In Hurley v McDonald’s Australia,55 the Full Federal Court held that 
                                                                                                                                                 
48
  See for example Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Anthony v Vaclav [2009] VSC 357; Tanwar 
Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315; Mighell v Gargoura [2009] NSWSC 248; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 
51; Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-741; Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682. 
49
  For example Anthony v Vaclav [2009] VSC 357. 
50
  For example Byrne v Cope Street Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 947; Zhang v Vp302 Spv [2009] NSWSC 
73. 
51
  For example, Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315; Barreau Peninsula Pty 
Ltd v Ambassador at Redcliffe Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 90. 
52
        [2006] VSC 48. 
53
       Ibid, [197]. 
54
      Ibid, [200]. 
55
       (2000) ATPR 41-741. 
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before ss 51AA, 51AB or 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
56
 will apply, there 
must be some circumstance other than the mere terms of the contract itself that would 
render reliance on the terms of the contract “unfair”, “unreasonable”, “immoral” or 
“wrong”.57 A similar pattern is seen in other cases where successful buyers of real estate 
required evidence of conduct in the seller that was characterized as unconscionable or as 
taking advantage of the position of the buyer.
58
 Underlying the judicial emphasis on the 
need for the seller’s conduct as opposed to the terms of the contract to be unfair, is the 
traditional theory that a contract which is freely negotiated contains obligations 
voluntarily assumed. In the absence of conduct that impinges upon that assumption, a 
court will be loathed to interfere with the contract agreed between the parties. For 
example, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings 
Pty Ltd,
59
 the lessor, in negotiations with the lessee for consent to an assignment of the 
lease, was able to secure an agreement beneficial to the lessor, but detrimental to the 
lessee. The lessor knew that the lessee wanted to sell the business and assign the lease 
due to personal circumstances and used that fact to secure a release from the lessee in 
relation to a prior claim against the lessor. A majority of the High Court merely viewed 
the lessor as driving a hard bargain rather than taking advantage of a weakness of the 
lessee, who was well aware of the consequences of their agreement. The fact that the 
final agreement contained terms detrimental to the rights of the lessee was irrelevant to 
the High Court’s decision.  
 
A similar phenomenon has occurred in decisions based on the Contracts Review Act 1980 
(NSW), which, on its face, gives a court the right to declare void, refuse to enforce, vary 
or modify a contract or a provision in a contract found to be “unjust”.60 The expression 
“unjust” is defined in the Act as “unconscionable, harsh or oppressive”.61  Despite its 
                                                 
56
  These sections were re-enacted in the Australian Consumer Law, ss 20, 21 and 22. From 1 January 
2012, s 21 and 22 have been combined and re-enacted at s 21 Australian Consumer Law. 
57
        (2000) ATPR 41-741, [31]. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty    
  Ltd [2004] FCA 926, [94].  
58
  See for example Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 where the reliance by 
the seller on the time of the essence provision in the contract was not unconscionable because the 
seller did not contribute to or cause the buyer’s finance to be late. 
59
  (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
60
   Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) s 7. 
61
    Ibid s 4 (1). 
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broad application to contracts generally, the provisions of this Act have rarely been used 
to strike down terms of land contracts, with the great majority of cases in the last 20 years 
concerning unjust contracts arising predominantly in relation to mortgages, guarantees or 
leases.
62
 The number of claims of unfair terms in land contracts or unfair practices by 
sellers of land is small with an estimated 18 claims of unconscionable conduct related to 
land contract terms
63
 and 7 claims of unjust contracts under the Contracts Review Act 
1980 (NSW)
64
 by buyers in Australia in the last 10 years.
65
 In the majority of claims 
involving land contracts, an unjust contract has arisen largely from unfair lending or 
investment practices, misleading conduct or unconscionable conduct at the time of entry 
into the agreement, rather than the terms of the contract being substantively unfair.
66
 
Even when a finding of substantive unfairness in the terms of the contract is made, the 
result has also depended upon the unmeritorious conduct of the other party in the 
negotiations for the contract. For example, in Mighell v Gargoura,
67
 elderly sellers under 
some financial stress were induced to sell their property to the manager of a financier 
upon improvident terms. The agreement included the payment of a wholly 
disproportionate fee (when compared to the value of their property) as consideration for 
the grant of an option to buy back the property and a leaseback at very high yearly rental 
payable in advance until they were in a position to buy the property back. Whilst Palmer 
                                                 
62
  Refer to the analysis of the cases law utilising the Contracts Review Act 1980 in TM Carlin “The 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) – 20 years on” (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 125. An audit of 
cases since 2001 by the authors reveals that the statistics still accurately reflect the position. 
63
  Claims under common law principles, s 51AB Trade Practices Act 1974 (now Australian Consumer 
Law, s 21) and State Fair Trading equivalents as at 7 April 2010. Most of these claims concerned 
relief against forfeiture of money or where one party took advantage of a constitutional weakness 
such as age, blindness or lack of comprehension of the English language. 
64
  Claims of unfair terms under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) involving terms of a contract 
for the sale of land. Many of these cases involved misrepresentations or misleading conduct or 
taking advantage of a constitutional vulnerability. 
65
  Similarly under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 (UK) (and its 
predecessor) only one claim involving a sale of land has been reported: Khatun v Newham LBC 
[2005] QB 37.  In the proposal by the European Union for a Consumer Rights Directive, including 
unfair terms, contracts for the sale of land will be excluded from its operation. Refer to the summary 
at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/609&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN> (accessed 21 April 2011). 
66
  See for example Byrne v Cope Street Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 946; Zhang v Vp302 Spv [2009] 
NSWSC 73 (terms of contract not unjust but entered as a result of misleading conduct); Chalhoub 
v Chalhoub [2005] NSWSC 572 (based on unconscionable conduct); Xu v Lin [2005] NSWSC 569 
(unconscionable conduct). 
67
         [2009] NSWSC 248. 
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J considered the circumstances which led to the execution of the option by the sellers, his 
Honour also considered individual clauses in the Option Deed, which he noted had some 
“highly unusual features” such as: 
 
1. the sellers were to pay the buyer’s stamp duty and legal fees on the contract; 
2. the sellers were to pay rent and council rates in advance for a year; 
3. the sellers were to pay the insurance on the property during the option term; and 
4. the option fee might be forfeited if the property was not kept in a condition 
satisfactory to the buyer.
68
 
 
Palmer J found the Option Deed to be “harsh, unjust and improvident in its terms”.69 If 
the sellers had not received ineffectual independent advice, which they appeared to 
ignore, Palmer J indicated that he would have found the buyer guilty of unconscionable 
conduct.
70
 He concluded that the transaction produced “both substantive unfairness –
being the harsh terms in the agreements operating upon the sellers’ circumstances and 
procedural unfairness in that the sellers had no real opportunity to negotiate”.71 This 
decision is an excellent example of the difficulty in separating both forms of unfairness in 
any one transaction as the acceptance of unfair terms by the weaker party to the 
transaction usually arises from some oppressive conduct practised upon them.  
 
The reported cases provide evidence that buyers of real estate do consider certain terms 
of land contracts to be unfair, either because they are substantively unfair
72
 or that sellers 
are using their bargaining position to unfairly take advantage of certain terms in 
circumstances where the buyer is unaware of the effect of the term. Even though the 
number of claims of unfair terms by buyers of real estate is comparatively small,
73
 
                                                 
68
  Ibid [40]. 
69
  Ibid [61]. 
70
  Ibid [61]. 
71
  Ibid [69]. 
72
  For example clauses in contracts of the sale of units that allow a seller to alter the subject matter of 
the sale without the consent of the buyer: Mirvac (Docklands) Pty Ltd v La Rocca [2006] VSC 48. 
73
  Refer to the data collected by Consumer Affairs Victoria in 2006, Consumer Detriment in Victoria: 
A Survey of its Nature, Costs and Implications, Research Paper No. 10, October. Land contracts are 
a small component when compared to the numerous claims of unfair terms in contracts for financial 
products, mobile phones, gym membership and travel. 
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community expectation of ethical conduct by sellers and the need for market efficiencies 
may provide sufficient justification for regulatory intervention. 
   
III  WHICH LAND CONTRACTS ARE STANDARD FORM CONSUMER 
CONTRACTS? 
The unfair terms provisions of the ACL apply only to standard form consumer contracts. 
A consumer contract is a contract for: 
(a) a supply of goods or services; or 
(b) a sale or grant of an interest in land; 
to an individual whose acquisition of the goods, services or interest is wholly or 
predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
 
Several important aspects of the definition in the context of land contracts should be 
noted. First, the consumer acquiring the interest in land must be an “individual”. This 
excludes from the operation of the provisions any contracts where the buyer of the land is 
a corporation, whether private or public. Secondly, the definition focuses on the purpose 
for which the land is acquired, rather than the nature of the land purchased. This means 
that whether the contract is a ‘consumer contract’ will be determined by reference to the 
subjective intention of the consumer. Theoretically, it is therefore, possible for a sale or 
lease of commercial land to be a consumer contract, if the acquirer is intending to use the 
land for personal purposes.
74
 This threshold requirement is problematic. First, can it be 
assumed that the purpose of the purchase, ie for personal residence or investment, is 
tested at the date of contract and not at the date of completion? Secondly, what evidence 
might be required to properly prove that intention of the consumer, a declaration in 
writing by the buyer at contract? The adoption of a definition governed by the purpose 
for which the consumer is acquiring the land creates difficulties for drafters of contracts 
who will need to assume that a contract involving residential land is a consumer contract, 
despite the fact the same contract may also be used to sell to investors. The inclusion of a 
warranty in the contract by the consumer that he or she is purchasing for business or 
                                                 
74
  However, a declaration by the buyer that the land is purchased for commercial purposes may be 
difficult to overcome. See for example Leveraged Equities Limited v Goodridge (2011) 191 FCR 71.  
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investment purposes, while providing some initial comfort, is unlikely to prevent a court 
from finding a term to be unfair if the consumer ultimately acquired the land for personal 
purposes.
75
 A court is more likely to approach an examination of the purpose of 
acquisition by considering the reality of the transaction.
76
 
 
In most cases, therefore, the following contracts involving an interest in land will not be 
consumer contracts:  
 a mortgage of land (this is a financial service and therefore subject to the 
equivalent provisions under ASIC);
77
 
 a transaction involving commercial, industrial or retail property (in most cases the 
purpose of acquisition will usually not be for personal, domestic or household 
use); or 
 a transaction involving residential property where the purpose of acquisition is for 
investment. 
 
In addition to being a consumer contract, the contract must also fulfil the requirements 
for a standard form contract. The vast majority of contracts for the sale and purchase of 
residential property are undertaken on printed form contracts approved by the relevant 
professional organisations within each Australian jurisdiction. For the purposes of this 
article, these contracts will be referred to as “printed form contracts”. Whether the terms 
of a contract are in a standard printed form is not determinative of whether it will be a 
“standard form contract” under the ACL. The definition is based upon qualitative factors 
relating to conduct, such as differences in bargaining power and whether an opportunity 
                                                 
75
  While there is no provision preventing the parties from contracting out of the ACL, in the writers’ 
view the courts are to approach the issue in a similar way to case of misleading conduct, having 
regard to the consumer protection policy of the ACL and that irrespective of the terms of the contract 
if the consumer did purchase for personal use, the contract will be considered to be a consumer 
contract.  
76
  This approach was adopted in Nooristani v Liberty Finance Pty Ltd [2009] VCAT 2724 when 
considering a similar test in the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). A similar approach was adopted by 
courts considering the purpose of acquiring financial services under the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code and National Credit Code: Linkenholt Pty Ltd v Quirk [2000] VSC 166; Jonsson v Arkway Pty 
Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 451; Benjamin v Ashikian [2007] NSWSC 735; Knowles v Victorian 
Mortgage Investments Ltd [2011] VSC 611. 
77
  Refer to Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth), ss 12BF – 12BM. 
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to negotiate was given, not the form in which the contract is presented. This makes 
formulation of a general rule about when a standard form contract exists, very difficult. 
  
The definition commences with the presumption that, unless proven otherwise, a contract 
is a standard form contract if one of the parties to the proceeding alleges it to be a 
standard form contract.
78
 A court may take into account “such matters as it thinks 
relevant”: but also “must take into account” a number of factors listed in the section in 
reaching a conclusion about whether the contract is a standard form contract.
79
 The 
mandatory factors to be considered by a court can be summarised as a combination of 
inequality of bargaining power and “the take it or leave it” nature of the negotiations. Due 
to the requirement for a court to consider the relationship of the parties and the nature of 
the negotiations, it is possible for an identically worded contract to be a standard form 
contract in one context, but not in another. It is not clear whether some criteria will carry 
more weight than the others and whether a court will only find a standard form contract if 
all criteria are present. The difficulty in applying the definition to a land contract is best 
illustrated by an example: 
 
Example  
A corporate owner of numerous parcels in a large subdivision uses a printed form 
contract with no special conditions to sell their vacant land. The land is offered for sale 
on standard terms that the owner will not agree to alter, except by the addition of details 
for finance approval. Each time a change to the contract is suggested by a buyer, the 
seller rejects the amendment.  
 
Criterion (a) – whether one of the parties has all or most of the bargaining power 
relating to the transaction 
Does one party have all or nearly all the bargaining power in the transaction? In other 
words, the court is required to consider if there is an imbalance in the bargaining power 
of the parties. There is some similarity in this respect with the requirement under the 
                                                 
78
  Australian Consumer Law, s 27(1). 
79
  Australian Consumer Law, s 27(2). 
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ACL, s 21
80
 for the court to consider the “relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
parties’ bargaining positions” and the Contracts Review Act 1980, s 7(2), to consider if 
there is any “material inequality in the bargaining power” of the parties.  In the context of 
those provisions, an imbalance or inequality in bargaining power is a factor relevant to 
whether a party has taken advantage of a weakness of the other party.
81
 The mere taking 
advantage of a superior bargaining position is usually insufficient for a court to intervene 
in the contract agreed on the basis of unconscionability.
82
  
 
The relevant importance of superior bargaining power is unclear in the definition of 
standard form contract. It appears as one factor in a list of five factors a court is required 
to consider.  Will a court require a causal link between the superior bargaining position of 
the seller and the existence of a contract, unchanged from the one presented by the seller? 
Alternatively, will the fact a contract prepared by the seller is signed in an unchanged 
form indicate all the bargaining power was reposed in the seller?  In the authors’ view, 
the definition requires an examination of the bargaining power of the seller in the context 
of the negotiation process and whether there was a genuine negotiation or a trampling of 
rights. Like unconscionable conduct, a superior bargaining position may be assumed 
more readily where an experienced seller is selling to an elderly buyer
83
 or a buyer unable 
to understand or speak English,
84
 a first home buyer,
85
 or a related party.  There may also 
be circumstances in which the bargaining position of the seller may be greater because of 
demand in the property market or the fact the buyer is desperate to buy a particular 
property to complete a development. If, however, both parties are equally experienced or 
represented by lawyers, there is unlikely to be an imbalance in the bargaining position 
between the parties. In such a case, it will be difficult to conclude that the contract is a 
‘standard form contract’ under the definition merely because a printed form contract is 
used with no amendment and minimal negotiation of terms.  
 
                                                 
80
  Previously Trade Practices Act 1974, ss 51AB and 51AC. 
81
         Usually the courts require a taking advantage of a constitutional disadvantage, such as inability to 
read or understand the document: Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 415. 
82
  ACCC v C G Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
83
  Anthony v Vaclav [2009] VSC 357. 
84
  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682. 
85
  Astrilla Pty Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2006] VSC 289. 
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It is suggested that much of the complaint of a weaker party can be neutralised by the 
seller (as the stronger party) insisting upon negotiation through an independent legal 
representative of the buyer (as the weaker party) from an early stage in the transaction. 
This factor which has led to the insistence of independent solicitor’s certificates in loan 
transactions and, to an extent, in retail leasing, may become an industry benchmark in the 
contracting process, particularly for sales of residential land. This, at least, would open 
the opportunity for negotiation and discussion and permits exchange on variation of terms 
to suit the individual buyer and would protect the buyer whose characteristics, such as 
age, infirmity, illiteracy or inexperience may hinder their ability to negotiate or treat with 
the seller. The employment of a legal representative to negotiate on behalf of the buyer 
(or the seller for that matter) may create a more reliable evidentiary trail which may lead 
to the rebuttal of the presumption that the contract would be deemed to be a standard 
form contract until proven otherwise, but this fact would not be conclusive, one way or 
the other, until the totality of the negotiating and contracting process was tested in the 
light of the definitions. 
 
Criterion (b) – whether the contract was prepared by one party before any discussion 
relating to the transaction occurred between the parties  
A printed form of contract has been prepared by the seller without consultation with the 
buyer fulfilling criterion (b). This is a common attribute of printed form contracts, 
especially in large developments. 
 
Criterion (c) – whether another party was, in effect, required either to accept or reject 
the terms of the contract in the form in which they were presented or whether another 
party was given an effective opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract  
Was the buyer given the opportunity to negotiate the terms or was the buyer required to 
accept the terms in the form provided? The seller has not prevented the buyer from 
putting forward new terms, but all new terms have been rejected. Arguably, the buyer has 
not been given an ‘effective’ opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract. The seller 
was unwilling to agree to changes to the standard terms put forward and, on that basis, 
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may be seen by a court to have provided those terms on a take it or leave it basis, despite 
a willingness to allow further terms to the agreement. 
 
Criterion (d) – whether the terms of the contract take into account the specific 
characteristics of another party or the particular transaction 
Do the terms take into account the characteristics of a party or the transaction? In the case 
of the printed form of contract, it is prepared as a standard contract to be used for the sale 
of houses and land. To that extent, it takes into account the requirements for a transaction 
in which land and houses are sold, as compared to a transaction for the sale of a unit. 
However, there is no account of the particular circumstances of the buyer, except in some 
cases allowing the sale to be subject to finance and a building inspection. If the seller is 
willing to agree to the addition of special conditions requested by the buyer, this may be 
sufficient evidence that the seller has adequately consulted the buyer to take the contract 
out of the category of “standard form contract”? However, on the other hand, the 
inclusion of  these special conditions over and above the printed conditions are not 
uncommon in the case of residential sales and some other factor might be needed to 
demonstrate that the buyer’s particular concerns in that transaction have been addressed 
in relation to other terms.  
 
E. Conclusions 
Land contracts to which the unfair terms provisions will apply are, therefore, limited to  
1. contracts for the sale of residential property;  
2. individuals who are proposing to live in the property; and 
3. where the seller used their superior bargaining position to suppress 
amendments to the contract prepared by the seller. 
 
The fact that the contract is a printed form contract is not decisive and, in the absence of 
an imbalance in the bargaining position of the parties, is unlikely to be a ‘standard form 
contract’.86 This narrow class of protected contracts does not include buyers of residential 
                                                 
86
        Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 462-463 per Mason J (as he then 
           was). 
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property for investment, some of whom may be buying their first investment and be no 
more experienced than any other consumer of real estate. Commonly, these buyers are 
purchasing strata title units ‘off the plan’ for investment from developers who are 
reluctant to negotiate changes to the contract of sale. Ironically, these types of contracts 
are the ones most in need of a fairness review with long and complex terms difficult for a 
lay person to understand and usually containing numerous one sided terms in favour of 
the seller. Buyers under ‘off the plan’ contracts, despite receiving significant information 
disclosure,
87
 usually execute contracts with numerous terms advantageous to the position 
of the seller, with few corresponding rights given to the buyer. The potential impact of 
the unfair terms provisions on common terms of ‘off the plan’ contracts will be 
examined.  
  
 
IV –UNFAIR TERMS IN LAND CONTRACTS 
A key aspect of any regulatory response is that a net benefit is achieved. The final part of 
this article will examine the potential benefits to consumers by critiquing the effect of the 
unfair terms provisions on a number of common terms in contracts for the sale of units 
‘off the plan’. The position of a buyer under the law existing prior to the unfair terms 
provisions will be compared against the position after application of the criteria for unfair 
terms in s 24 ACL. 
 
The terms for consideration have been identified by reference to the examples of unfair 
terms within the ‘grey list’ in s 25. The grey list is an indicative, but non-exhaustive list, 
of terms that may be unfair. The list provides statutory guidance on the types of terms 
that may be of concern, but the section does not “prohibit the use of those terms, nor 
do[es it] create a presumption that those terms are unfair”.88 Although the list indicates 
potentially unfair terms, whether a term is unfair must still be assessed in accordance 
                                                 
87
  For a detailed examination of disclosure regimes in Australia refer to Sharon Christensen, et al, 
“Evaluating Information Disclosure to Buyers of Real Estate” (2007) 2 QUT Law & Justice Journal 
148. 
88
  Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 
1) 2010 (Cth) p 23 at 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbil
lhome%2Fr4154%22> (accessed 18 May 2010).  
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with the criteria in s 24 ACL in the context of the contract as a whole.
89
 The examples in 
s 25 ACL are prima facie terms, which depending upon the other provisions of the 
contract, may cause a disproportionate imbalance in the rights of the parties to the 
contract. 
 
To properly critique the terms of a contract, it is first necessary to understand the criteria 
for determining the existence of an unfair term. 
 
A. Approach for determining unfair terms 
Whether a particular term is unfair should be determined by applying the three criteria in 
s 24 ACL having regard to the contract as a whole and the extent to which the term is 
transparent and any other surrounding circumstances the court considers relevant. 
 
The three criteria in s 24 ACL are: 
(a) Will the term cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract; and 
(b) Is the term reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party who 
would be advantaged by the term; and 
(c) Will the term cause detriment (financial or non-financial) if applied or relied upon by 
the other party?
90
 
 
The three criteria in s 24 ACL are, on their face, focused on the terms of the contract 
itself and do not prima facie require reference to the conduct of the parties leading up to 
or during negotiation of the contract. The additional contextual requirements of 
transparency and construing the particular term in light of the contract as a whole do not 
necessarily change that focus. The requirement for a court to consider the contract as a 
whole,
91
 necessitates an assessment of the written terms of the contract and whether, as a 
                                                 
89
  Note the contrary comments of Cavanough J in Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, 
[115] “a term answering any of the descriptions in paragraphs (a) – (m) might, depending on all the 
circumstances, be found to be an unfair term notwithstanding full prior knowledge on the part of the 
consumer”. 
90
  Australian Consumer Law, s 24(1). 
91
  Australian Consumer Law, s 24(2). 
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whole there is balance in the rights and obligations of the parties. Factors such as whether 
the unfair term is linked to a benefit in the contract, such as a cheap price, or the purpose 
of the terms, may be considered.
92
 However, the mere fact the contract contains terms 
favourable to the buyer does not necessarily counter the existence of an obviously unfair 
term.  
 
Whether a term is transparent will also involve an examination of the terms of the 
contract to determine if the potentially unfair term is in plain language, legible, clearly 
presented and readily available to any party affected by the term. The fact a term is 
drafted in legalese or complex language or is hidden in small print will be a factor in 
determining if there is a significant imbalance in the rights of the parties, but will not of 
itself mean the term is unfair. Likewise, a term drafted clearly, placed in a prominent 
position or drawn to the attention of the consumer may ultimately be substantively unfair 
despite being clear about its effect.
93
  
 
Finally, a court is given a broad discretion to take into account any other matters the court 
considers relevant. Potentially, a court may consider factors such as broad business 
practices in the relevant industry, the circumstances in which each relevant contract was 
made,
94
 whether the terms were brought to the attention of the consumer and whether the 
consumer had a reasonable opportunity to consider the terms of the contract.
95
 While the 
discretion appears prima facie wide, it is submitted that a court is more likely to have 
regard to circumstances or factors directly relevant to a consideration of the three criteria 
in s 24, which of their nature, concern the substantive terms of the contract. For example, 
factors relevant to whether a term creates a significant imbalance in the rights of the 
parties may include whether the term is essential or inessential to the bargain, whether the 
term is commonly used in the industry or whether the term is enforceable under the 
common law. Whether the term was brought to the attention of the consumer is suggested 
                                                 
92
  Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539. 
93
  Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Trainstation Health Clubs Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 2092. 
94
  Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, per Cavanough J. 
95
  Jeannie Paterson “The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The risk of substantive unfairness as 
a ground for review of standard form consumer contracts” (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 
934, 950. 
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by Paterson
96
 to be a further factor a court may consider either as part of transparency or 
as a discretionary factor. Knowledge of the term and an understanding of its effect may 
have some bearing on whether there is a significant imbalance in the rights of the parties, 
but, in the view of the authors, these procedural factors are not directly relevant to a 
consideration of the three criteria in s 24, as a term may be unfair irrespective of being 
brought to the attention of the consumer. Therefore, as a general proposition, whether a 
supplier’s conduct prior to contract is unconscionable,97 immoral or unfair, should not be 
determinative of whether a term itself is substantively unfair under the ACL,
98
 although it 
may ultimately influence a court’s view of the contract.99 Thus, whilst the failure to bring 
a term to the attention of a consumer may not amount to unconscionable conduct in 
certain circumstances, that fact may be a relevant consideration in determining whether 
the contract is a “standard form contract” within the meaning of the legislation. The same 
set of circumstances which give rise to a successful claim of unconscionable conduct, 
however, may not reveal an unfair term. 
 
 
Criterion 1 – Significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
The requirement for a significant imbalance appears also in the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 (UK). As stated by Bingham LJ in Director 
General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc,
100
 the requirement for a significant 
imbalance is met if “a term is so weighted in favour of the supplier as to tilt the parties’ 
                                                 
96
  Ibid. Paterson suggests that this will minimize the impact of the traditional principle that a party who 
signs a contract is presumed to have read the contract and agreed to be bound by all terms including 
onerous terms. Instead, under the unfair terms provisions, signed and unsigned contracts will be on 
the same footing when determining if a term is unfair. Refer also to Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v 
Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165. 
97
  A buyer will be able to seek redress separately for unconscionable conduct pursuant to the common 
law or the Australian Consumer Law. 
98
  Refer to the view of Lord Steyn in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc 
[2002] 1 All ER 97, 108 (HL). 
99
  This should be contrasted with the position under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (UK) where the conduct of a supplier and whether they acted in good faith is a 
specific consideration under the Act. In Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc 
[2002] 1 All ER 97, 108 (HL) the requirement of good faith was, in the view of Lord Bingham, a 
requirement for ‘fair and open dealing’ between the parties. Fair dealing required that the supplier 
did not take deliberate or unconscious advantage of the consumer’s “necessity, indigence, lack of 
experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract or weak bargaining position”. 
100
  [2002] 1 All ER 97 (HL). 
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rights and obligation under the contract significantly in his favour.” 101 “Significant” is a 
word that takes its meaning from the context in which it is used.
102
  It potentially covers a 
spectrum ranging from ‘not trivial’ through ‘appreciable’ to ‘important’, ‘substantial’ and 
‘momentous’.103 Likewise, when considering the now repealed unfair terms provisions of 
the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), Cavanough J held that ‘significant’ meant ‘significant in 
magnitude’ or ‘sufficiently large to be important’ or, in other words, that the imbalance 
should be substantial.
104
 This makes an assessment of this particular element, prima facie, 
a factual inquiry having regard to the particular term.
105
 In reaching a conclusion, a court 
is required to examine the term in light of the other provisions in the contract taking 
transparency into account. Contextual factors that may be relevant include: 
(i) whether there are other terms in the contract that are in favour of the consumer 
(ie reduced price,
106
 other benefits)
107
 
For example, a term may give the buyer a right to compensation for any deficiency in 
subject matter, but this right may be limited by the condition that a buyer must give 
notice in writing  prior to completion of their intention to claim compensation should 
the buyer intend to proceed with the purchase regardless. A failure to give notice 
would render the buyer’s right nugatory. Therefore, whilst a term giving a right to 
compensation would not appear to be offensive, if the rights are qualified too 
severely, that term may be struck down as an unfair term where the operation of the 
term significantly cuts down that right. 
 
                                                 
101
  [2002] 1 All ER 97, 107 (HL). 
102
  Emaas v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [2000] QCA 513, [26]. 
103
  Coombs v Bahama Palm Trading Pty Ltd [1991] Aust Contract Reports 90-002, 89,123 (considering 
the meaning of significant component in a sale of business). 
104
  Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, [105]. In Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v 
AAPT Ltd [2006] VCAT 1493 the view was expressed that this was a normative judgment about 
extent of unfairness. 
105
  See also Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 
(No 1) 2010, available at 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbil
lhome%2Fr4154%22> (accessed 18 May 2010). 
106
  Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539; Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v 
Backloads.com Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2009] VCAT 754; Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne 
Management Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 1237; Kucharski v Air Pacific Ltd (General) [2011] 
NSWCTTT 555 (reduced price airfare did not influence the fact that no refund provision was an 
unfair term). 
107
  Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2000] QB 672, 687 (CA). 
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(ii) was the term legible and easy for a lay person to understand; and 
(iii) was the meaning of the term readily apparent on a reading of the contract. 
 
It should be emphasised that the mere fact a term is legible or brought to the attention of 
the parties does not mean that it will be fair. The term may be of such a nature that, 
despite disclosure, the term is still considered by a court to meet the three criteria.
108
 
However, where a term is the subject of genuine negotiation between the parties, it will 
not be lightly considered to be unfair.
109
 Although this is not expressly an element of the 
test of unfairness,
110
 it would seem otiose for a party to be able to resile from a contract 
that genuinely reflects the bargain as negotiated.  
 
Other discretionary factors a court may take into account in determining a significant 
imbalance may include:  
(i) was the term brought to the attention of the consumer at the time of contract, 
(ii) is the term common within the particular industry,  
(iii) is the term an essential aspect of the bargain,  
(iv) does the term follow the common law position;111 and  
(v) is the term of a type listed in the examples of unfair terms in s 25 of the ACL.  
 
 
Criterion 2 – Protection of the seller’s legitimate interests 
The next element is that the term was not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party proves 
otherwise.
112
 This reversal of the onus of proof will require the advantaged party to 
produce evidence of their legitimate interest and to prove on the balance of probabilities 
that the term was reasonably necessary to protect that interest. What is a legitimate 
                                                 
108
  Refer to the comments of Cavanough J in Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, [115]. 
109
  Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Craig Langley Pty Ltd & Matrix Pilates & Yoga Pty Ltd 
[2008] VCAT 482, [66]. 
110
  An opportunity to negotiate is an element of whether there is a standard form contract, Australian 
Consumer Law, s 27(2). 
111
  Jeanie Maree Paterson, “The elements of a prohibition on unfair terms in consumer contracts” 
(2009) 37 Australian Business Law Review 184, 191. 
112
  Australian Consumer Law, s 24(4). 
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interest will vary depending upon the nature of the land, the price paid for the land and 
the other terms of the transaction as a whole. In the case of a seller of land, the seller has 
a legitimate interest in being able to hold the buyer to the bargain within a reasonable or 
agreed time. Whilst the land is contracted to be sold to the buyer, it is not available for 
sale to another party and is effectively off the market. If the buyer fails to complete, the 
seller loses opportunities for other sales. Consequently, any security such as a deposit, 
binding the buyer to the bargain is arguably a term that is in the legitimate interests of the 
seller. This would be the case notwithstanding the buyer has no monetary security which 
binds the seller to the bargain. 
 
Other discretionary contextual factors a court may take into account in determining the 
legitimate interests of a party include industry norms, risks inherent in the transaction, the 
financial position of the parties and the state of the real estate market for that product at 
the time of contracting. The latter consideration, that is, whether there is a seller’s or 
buyer’s market, can often determine the approach taken by a seller to the transaction. It is 
submitted that ultimately a court may be unwilling to find a term reasonably necessary to 
protect a legitimate interest unless the term is proportionate to the potential risk and the 
interest sufficiently outweighs the detriment to the consumer. This may result in close 
scrutiny of whether common standard conditions, long accepted and commonly found in 
land sale contracts, which reflect industry norms are in reality necessary to protect the 
seller’s interests. Whilst the interests of sellers of residential property are common to an 
extent, the varied nature of the subject matter (‘off the plan’, new, ‘renovators delight’) 
and the different personal attributes of sellers mean that what is required to protect one 
seller’s legitimate interests may differ from that required to protect those of another.113 It 
is suggested that a court is likely to find that a term is not reasonably necessary to protect 
the legitimate interests of a party where the party has adequate common law or statutory 
protection or where the term goes beyond that countenanced by the law. For example, in 
a different but related context, where a lender was entitled contractually to recover all 
loss and expenses it suffered as a consequence of a default, a term providing for interest 
                                                 
113
  See for example PSAL Ltd v Kellas-Sharpe [2012] QSC 31where Applegarth J gave careful 
consideration to the business expenses of the application in deciding whether there was a legitimate 
reason for capitalising interest monthly. 
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at a rate of 75% was considered to not be reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate 
interest of the mortgagee and unjust under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
114
 
Although the provision for payment of higher interest was not a penalty at law, the 
recovery of additional interest together with costs and expenses arising from the breach 
was unjust and under the Australian Consumer Law may be an unfair term.
115
 This 
severable term would not only be unfair for that reason, but in the absence of the 
legislation would be struck down as a penalty. There is inevitably going to be crossovers 
with existing protective doctrines which have been widely accepted and may be easier to 
apply. 
 
Criterion 3 – Financial or non-financial detriment 
The final element is that the term if relied upon or applied would cause financial or non-
financial detriment to the consumer.
116
 The consumer will, therefore, be required to prove 
that if the term is allowed to stand, the consumer will as a result suffer detriment 
financially or non-financially. There is no requirement for the consumer to prove that 
prior to enforcement of the term, detriment was suffered.  Proof of financial detriment 
clearly requires proof of a financial loss or expenditure. Non-financial detriment may 
include mental distress, inconvenience – or other personal injury.  
 
Detriment is not currently an element or factor expressly required for a finding of 
unconscionable conduct or an unjust contract, although loss of some kind will usually 
flow to the vulnerable party in those circumstances. Consequently, the most that can be 
stated about this requirement is that:  
(i) actual detriment or loss is not necessary; potential or threatened detriment if the 
term is enforced is sufficient; 
                                                 
114
  Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd (2008) 229 FLR 4, [161], [166], [174], [178] (CA) (under 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)). 
115
   See also PSAL Ltd v Kellas-Sharpe [2012] QSC 31. 
116
   Examples of unfair terms are listed in Australian Consumer Law, s 25. Regulations may also 
prescribe kinds of unfair terms, however in doing so the Minister must take certain matters into 
consideration: see Australian Consumer Law, s 25(2), inserted by the Senate: Schedule of 
amendments made by the Senate (2010) Parliament of Australia 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId
=r4335> (accessed 21 May 2012). 
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(ii) the detriment will have to be to the party to the contract and not a third party; 
(iii) the disadvantaged party will have the onus of proving detriment; 
(iv) failure to provide evidence of detriment is likely to be fatal to the disadvantaged 
party’s claim. 
 
B. Assessing the identified terms in off the plan contracts 
The approach to determining if a term is unfair, considered above, will be further 
examined in the context of common terms in off the plan contracts identified as 
potentially unfair. This examination will highlight the likely interaction of existing 
common law principles with the unfair terms provisions and the discretionary factors a 
court may take into account when assessing the fairness of particular terms. 
 
 
Term 1 – Limitation of right to terminate or claim compensation 
Land contracts commonly include a term providing that a misdescription or error in the 
particulars for the land in the contract will not annul the sale, but the buyer will be 
entitled to compensation for the deficiency, if notified to the seller prior to settlement.  
 
Example: Limitation of right to terminate or claim compensation 
No error or misdescription in the particulars of the land in the contract will annul the sale 
but the buyer will be entitled to compensation for the deficiency, if notified to the seller 
prior to settlement. 
 
Does this term cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights? As the term falls 
within the example in s 25(1)(a) ACL:  
a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) 
to avoid or limit performance of the contract. 
 
First, the actual impact of the term on the rights of the parties should be considered 
having regard to a construction of the term in the eyes of the law. Terms to this effect 
have been the subject of previous litigation by buyers under the general law. Generally, 
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the operation of such a term has always been subject to the rule in Flight v Booth,
117
 
which provides that a buyer should not be forced to complete a contract with 
compensation where the error or misdescription is so substantial that a buyer would be 
forced to accept a property substantially different from that which they contracted to buy. 
This rule is one of universal application to land contracts both in relation to 
misdescriptions and defects in title.
118
 At common law, therefore, the buyer would be 
able to withdraw from the contract, despite the term, if a substantial defect in title or 
misdescription were discovered. The effect of the term at law will therefore be: 
(i) a buyer is unable to terminate the contract for a minor or immaterial defect or 
misdescription, but compensation is claimable; 
(ii) a buyer is only able to claim compensation for a minor defect if notice is 
given prior to settlement. 
 
Under equitable principles, the position of the buyer is similar. A buyer is unable to 
terminate a contract for a minor defect, but a court will not order specific performance of 
the contract unless compensation for the defect is paid.
119
 The only difference between 
the effect of the term and the common law is the requirement to notify of the claim. In the 
authors’ view, this will not be sufficient to reach the benchmark of creating a significant 
imbalance in the rights of the parties. Generally, the standard printed terms give effect to 
this common law principle, whereby the seller is required to disclose latent defects in title 
(traditionally difficult for a buyer to discover) and the buyer is required to satisfy 
themselves of the physical aspects and other rights to use the property.
120
 Some additional 
rights of termination may be provided by the printed terms where a matter (that is not a 
defect in title) adverse to the property is discovered
121
 and this adds weight to the 
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  (1834) 1 Bing NC 370, 377; 131 ER 1160, 1160-1161. 
118
   Torr v Harpur (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 585; (existence of large storm water drain); King v St Patrick’s 
Day (Minhamite) Pty Ltd [1971] VR 777 (drainage easement undisclosed); Re Glenning [1987] 2 Qd 
R 523 (electricity authority easement). 
119
  Rutherford v Acton-Adams [1915] A.C. 866; Southland Investments Limited v Public Trustee [1943] 
NZLR 580; Leighton Properties Pty Ltd v Hurley [1984] 2 Qd R 534. 
120
  This is referred to as the principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). For a discussion of the 
origins of caveat emptor see A M Weinberger, ‘Let the Buyer be Well Informed – Doubting the 
Demise of Caveat Emptor’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 387 and J B Pomeranz, ‘The State of 
Caveat Emptor in Alaska as it Applies to Real Property’ (1996) 13 Alaska Law Review 237 
121
  Refer for example, to the REIQ Houses and Land Contract 9
th
 ed, clause 7.7. 
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conclusion that the term, when considered in the context of the contract as a whole, does 
not create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights. 
 
Is there a legitimate interest of the seller protected by this clause? At law, a seller is 
required to disclose to a buyer the existence of latent defects in the seller’s title to the 
property.
122
 The buyer’s right to terminate for a failure to disclose a defect in title or 
misdescription is limited to substantial and material defects.
123
 In the absence of a term 
providing for compensation for a defect in title to be paid, a buyer is unable to seek 
compensation from the seller, unless ordered by a court as part of a claim for specific 
performance.
124
 The term, therefore, provides a benefit to the buyer that would not 
ordinarily be available at law. 
 
Does the buyer suffer a detriment if the term is enforced? The only possible detriment to 
the buyer is that compensation will be denied if the claim is not notified prior to 
settlement. Arguably, a buyer is in no worse a position than under the common law where 
a buyer will only be able to enforce a right to compensation as part of a claim for specific 
performance. 
 
An application of the unfair terms provisions is unlikely to alter the position of a buyer 
under this type of clause. The buyer’s right to terminate for substantial defects is 
protected by the common law and provision of a right to compensation is consistent with 
the common law position. 
 
Term 2 – Right of seller to avoid contract unilaterally  
A term to this effect commonly appears in contracts for the sale of strata units by 
developers. The purpose of the clause is to allow a developer to terminate the contract 
where they are unable to obtain approval for the development or sufficient funding. 
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  Refer to Faruqui v English Real Estates Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 963, 967. 
123
  Flight v Booth (1834) 1 Bing NC 370;(1834) 131 ER 1160; Liverpool Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon 
Lynton Car Sales [1978] Qd R 279, (affirmed [1979] QdR 103); Re Glenning [1987] 2 Qd R 523  
124
  Rutherford v Acton-Adams [1915] A.C. 866; Southland Investments Limited v Public Trustee [1943] 
NZLR 580; Leighton Properties Pty Ltd v Hurley [1984] 2 Qd R 534. 
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Example: Right of seller to avoid contract unilaterally 
The seller may terminate the contract at any time if: 
(i) the project is considered in the absolute discretion of the seller to be unviable; or  
(ii) the seller does not receive development approval by 30 June. 
 
Prima facie, this is a term that falls within s 25(1)(b) as: 
a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) 
to terminate the contract. 
 
Alternatively it is a term within s 25(1)(a) as it permits one party and not the other to 
avoid or limit performance. Does this term cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights? Prima facie, there is an imbalance because only the seller is able to elect to 
avoid the contract, usually in their absolute discretion. Terms of this nature have been 
challenged on the basis the seller has a discretion to perform, making the contract 
illusory. Where “words which by themselves constitute a promise are accompanied by 
words showing that the pomisor is to have a discretion or option as to whether he will 
carry out that which purports to be a promise, the result is that there is no contract on 
which an action can be brought at all”.125 Terms allowing a seller to elect to terminate 
the contract are in danger of making the contract illusory, unless the discretion of the 
seller is required to be exercised within clearly articulated parameters.
126
 For example, 
it is readily accepted that where a contract is subject to the buyer obtaining finance 
‘satisfactory to the buyer’ that this is not an unfettered discretion and must be exercised 
honestly.
127
 In the example given, the seller has an absolute discretion to avoid if the 
project is unviable and must do so by 30 June. If the term is not illusory, whether it 
causes a significant imbalance in rights should be considered in light of other terms in 
the contract. If the term appeared in a typical developer’s contract for the sale of a unit 
‘off the plan’, there are usually other terms that restrict the buyer’s right of termination 
while allowing the seller flexibility to change aspects of the unit to be constructed. In 
                                                 
125
  Placer Developments Ltd v The Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353, 356; Loftus v Roberts (1902) 
18 TLR 532; Broome v Speak [1903] 1 Ch 586. 
126
  Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130, 135-137; Demtear Pty Ltd v 
Abelian Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 103. 
127
  Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571, 580-582. 
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this context, there is a reasonable argument that a term which allows a seller the 
discretion to avoid the contract, albeit within limits, satisfies the first criteria of 
creating a significant imbalance in the rights of the parties. 
 
Is there a legitimate interest of the seller protected by this clause? A term of this nature 
included in a contract for the sale of a unit yet to be constructed will often provide the 
seller with the ability to sell units prior to obtaining development approval or 
development finance. In practice, the seller will need to secure at least 60% - 80% 
presales to obtain sufficient finance to proceed with the development, making it 
important that the seller is able to enter contracts before finance is obtained, but if the 
presales requirement is not met and finance refused, the seller can avoid the contracts.  
Given the precarious nature of funding after the global financial crisis, this may be 
viewed by a court as a legitimate reason for such a clause. 
 
Does the buyer suffer a detriment if the term is enforced? If the term is relied upon by 
the seller and the contract avoided, the buyer will be entitled to the return of their 
deposit and in the absence of a term to the contrary, the interest earned. Indirect 
detriment may arise if the buyer is prevented from purchasing another property because 
of the contract which is ultimately avoided. This may not be sufficient to encourage a 
court, given the findings in relation to the other criteria, to conclude the term is unfair.  
 
Clauses that allow a seller under a developer contract to terminate within a certain time 
frame if the project is financially unviable or development approval cannot be obtained 
are unlikely to be unfair terms. Where the clause does not explicitly contain parameters 
for the seller’s discretion to terminate, the contract will be illusory under the common law 
and not enforceable by either party. If the clause is enforceable, the detriment to the 
buyer will be minimal as the deposit and interest earned are usually recoverable. 
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Term 3 – Seller may alter subject matter between contract and completion 
Contracts for the sale of units yet to be constructed commonly contain a term that gives 
the seller a right to make alterations or changes to various aspects of the proposed 
property up to completion.  
 
Example: Seller may alter subject matter between contract and completion 
 
The buyer agrees that the seller may vary the building plans, area of the lot to be sold and 
the fixtures and fittings at any time during construction. The buyer shall not be entitled to 
terminate the contract or claim compensation for these changes. 
 
Prima facie, such a term falls within s 25(1)(g) as a term that: 
permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to vary the 
characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied or the interest in land to be 
sold or granted under the contract. 
 
Does this term create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights? In ordinary standard 
land contracts, a buyer may be able to claim compensation for misdescription where the 
description of the subject matter in the contract does not substantially meet the 
description of the actual property at completion.
128
 These standard provisions give buyers 
access to rights of compensation for contractual misdescription and are usually qualified 
by “words of approximation”129 which give the seller a small leeway in describing what 
is being sold, subject to the payment of compensation. In developer contracts,
130
 the 
buyer agrees to allow changes by the seller to various physical aspects of the property 
and, in addition, to relinquish any rights to termination or compensation for the changes.  
Where the changes are substantial a buyer will be entitled at law to terminate and claim 
compensation on the basis they are no longer getting substantially that for which they 
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  Edson v Sun Koung Restaurant Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11,452, 11,459 (compensation calculated at 
cost of rectification to remedy the deficiency); Liverpool Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon Lynton Car 
Sales Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 103(FC). 
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       Owmist Pty Ltd v Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 196, 197. 
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the Australian Consumer Law, s 27. 
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bargained.
131
 When viewed in light of the other terms of the contract, which commonly 
give other unilateral rights to the seller, there is some argument that the term creates an 
imbalance in the parties’ rights. 
 
In any event, is there a legitimate reason for such a term?  Proponents of the term argue 
that it is essential because of the nature of the construction process. Exigencies of 
building and the possibility of changes during the course of construction, which may be 
required by the local authority or some other similar agency, and which are unforeseen at 
the time of contract, may be necessary to complete the building. A similar view was 
accepted in Mirvac (Docklands) Pty Ltd v La Rocca.
132
 A buyer of an apartment “off the 
plan” claimed that a term which allowed the seller to vary the building plans and 
specifications from time to time during construction in any manner that the seller 
considered necessary or desirable, including by substituting any fixtures or fittings with 
appliances of like quality, was unfair, unjust and unreasonable. Hargrave J, found that 
such a provision did not meet that alleged description as it was not unfair or unreasonable 
to permit the seller some “reasonable flexibility” to amend the building plans and 
specifications during the lengthy construction phase given the large scale of the 
development.
133
 
 
Does the buyer suffer a detriment if the clause is enforced? Where there are major 
discrepancies in what was promised and what is delivered at completion, the buyer may 
terminate the contract despite the term. Conversely, if the change is only minor, the buyer 
is required to accept the property in that form and pay the full price. In the absence of the 
clause, a buyer would not be entitled to compensation for a minor defect, except as a 
consequence of an order for specific performance obtained by the seller.
134
 The absence 
of a term allowing compensation, coupled with a term giving the seller some discretion as 
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       For example, see Gold Coast Carlton Pty Ltd v Kamalesvaran [1984] Q Conv R 54-144 (failure of 
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to the nature of the subject matter might, at first glance, appear to cause detriment to a 
buyer. However, the key to testing such terms might be the degree to which the seller 
requires some leeway in the construction process. For example, allowing the seller a 
difference of some 5% in area in the finished product might not be unfair without 
compensation whereas a 10% difference may well be unfair. 
 
The position of a buyer subject to a provision allowing the seller of a unit under 
construction, to make minor changes to the physical aspects of the property is unlikely to 
be unfair. Even if the clause purports to exclude liability where substantial changes are 
made, this will be read down by a court mindful of the industry practice and the 
exigencies of the construction process, avoiding an application of the unfair terms 
provisions. 
 
Term 4 – No Representation Clause 
Many standard contracts for the sale of land contain a clause which purports to deny legal 
effect to any representations that are not contained in the written contract.  
Example: No Representation Clause 
The buyer acknowledges that  they have not relied on any representations by the seller, 
the seller’s agent or any other person or persons or corporation in entering into this 
contract other than as set out in this contract and that the conditions and stipulations in 
this contract constitutes the only agreement between the buyer  and the seller.” 
 
Generally, it has been held that in the absence of fraud, misrepresentations of fact made 
by a seller or a seller’s agent135 will not be actionable where the buyer and seller are 
parties to a contract of sale containing such a term. Consequently, an entire agreement 
clause could be described as limiting the effect, or having the effect of limiting the 
buyer’s right to sue the seller136 or, in the case, where an agent is employed by the seller, 
having the effect of limiting the seller’s liability for their agents.137 However, if the buyer 
                                                 
135
  Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91, 97; Silverton Ltd v F S 
Carroll Pty Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 72, 81. 
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  Australian Consumer Law, s 25(1)(k). 
137
  Australian Consumer Law, s 25(1)(i). 
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can prove, in the alternative, misleading or deceptive conduct under the relevant 
statute,
138
 it is clear that a no representations clause will generally be ineffective to 
exclude or modify the buyer’s rights.139 
 
It could be argued that such a term does create a significant imbalance in the rights of the 
parties and goes beyond what is reasonable to protect the legitimate interest of the seller 
or the seller’s agent. The operation of the clause would have the effect of denying the 
buyer a right to claim damages for loss suffered as a result of a negligent 
misrepresentation should the buyer wish to proceed with the contract of sale as well as 
denying the buyer the right to rescind based upon an innocent or negligent 
misrepresentation.
140
 Although the statutory rights of a buyer under disclosure legislation 
to terminate for a failure to disclose or for a misleading disclosure are not affected by 
such a clause, it is difficult to divine a legitimate reason for a seller to be able to limit 
their liability for false representations that induce the contract. If the term is unfair, the 
contract could be performed without the term and it could be severed from the contract. 
 
No representation clauses in standard form consumer contracts are at significant risk of 
being unfair. The right of a buyer to sue the seller for misrepresentation is significantly 
altered while the right of a seller to sue the buyer is retained, creating a significant 
imbalance in rights.
141
 A seller will struggle to provide evidence of a legitimate interest in 
limiting the buyer’s rights to avoid the operation of the presumption that no legitimate 
interest exists.
142
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Two aims of this article were posed. The first was to identify the problems, if any, faced 
by consumers of real estate who purchase residential property for personal occupation 
using standard form contracts. Interestingly, the analysis of reported case law failed to 
identify any endemic problems of unfairness with standard printed terms or land contracts 
more generally. This is consistent with the minimal evidence of unfair terms in land 
contracts presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry. Although the prevailing 
view is that standard printed terms are on the whole balanced, consumers of land are still 
making claims of inequity, unfairness or unconscionable conduct, that are not 
insignificant. Buyers are currently unable to obtain a remedy where a term unfairly 
advantages the seller, unless the seller misrepresented the effect of the term or exercised 
some form of duress or influence to force the buyer to agree to the term. The difficulty of 
avoiding the operation of an unfair term, absent evidence of unconscionable conduct, 
estoppel, duress or misleading conduct, does in the authors’ view provide sufficient 
justification in light of community expectations of fairness and the need to ensure 
efficiency in the real estate market, to justify regulatory intervention. 
 
The second aim was to explore the impact and discernible benefit to be gained by 
consumers of real estate from an application of the unfair terms provisions.  The article 
identifies only a small number of common clauses which might in certain circumstances 
be subject to challenge. The analysis demonstrates that consumers of real estate are well 
protected by the operation of common law and equitable principles in the context of 
standard printed terms, as well as State, Territory and Federal laws providing for 
consumer safeguards such as mandatory disclosure and cooling off periods out of which 
the parties cannot contract. The potential application of the unfair terms provisions, are 
therefore, likely to be limited to terms impervious to the operation of those principles. In 
the authors’ view, the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions is, therefore, 
likely to be limited to all but the most egregious terms. Changes to the practices of 
contracting parties are likely to centre on avoiding the existence of a standard form 
contract. Given the definition of standard form contract, this may produce changes in the 
negotiation phase where sellers may be more willing to bring unusual or detrimental 
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clauses to the attention of the buyer and insist that a buyer obtains independent legal 
advice about the terms before signature. Changes to the actual terms of standard form 
contracts are likely to be limited to those unfair or unbalanced terms, which are not 
already softened by the common law, equity or statute.  The modest short list of unfair 
terms remaining after application of these principles or provisions, justifies the authors’ 
conclusion that in the context of land contracts, the unfair terms provisions are unlikely to 
result in any significant realignment of the existing contractual positions of buyers and 
sellers of land. 
